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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROVO CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
BUDDY A. KUMMER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20030260-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the evidence was insufficient to support Kummer's conviction for 
driving under the influence of drugs? "[W]e will conclude that the evidence was 
insufficient when, after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" State 
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, |18, 10 P.3d 346, 352 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1 
1212 (Utah 1993)). 
2. Whether defense counsel's failure to move for a dismissal at the conclusion of the 
City's case in chief constituted ineffective assistance of counsel? The claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel for "failing to make a motion for directed verdict 
succeeds only if the State's evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction." State v. 
Reyes, 2000 UT App 310 (memorandum decision); see Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 
222 (Utah 1993), cert denied 510 U.S. 1050, 114 S.Ct. 706, 126 L.Ed.2d 671 (1994). 
Where the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct 
appeal, the issue is resolved as a matter of law. State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177, 1179 
(Utah App.), cert denied 883 P.2d 1359 (1994). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of all relevant statutory and constitutional provisions is set forth in the 
Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A* Nature of the Case 
Buddy A. Kummer appeals form the judgment, sentence, and commitment of the 
Third Judicial District Court after a conviction of driving under the influence of drugs, a 
class B misdemeanor. 
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B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Kummer was charged by Information filed on or about November 7, 2002, 
charging him with Driving Under the Influence, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of 
Section 41-6-44 of the Utah Code Annotated and Unsafe Lane Change, a Class C 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 41-6-61 of the Utah Code Annotated (R. 3-4). On 
December 5, 2002, at Kummer's arraignment hearing, he entered not guilty pleas and a 
pretrial date was set for January 16, 2003 (R. 6-8). At that time the trial court also found 
Kummer indigent and appointed the public defender to represent him in the matter. 
At the pretrial, a bench trial was set for February 24, 2003 (R. 18-19). After a trial 
on the matter on February 24, 2003, Kummer was found guilty of both counts and 
sentencing was scheduled for March 3, 2003 (R. 20-23). On March 3, 2003, Kummer 
was sentenced and a term in jail of thirty (30) days was imposed with all but two (2) days 
suspended. Kummer was also ordered to pay a total fine of $1,352 total on both counts 
and placed on eighteen (18) months court probation (R. 25-28). 
A Notice of Appeal was filed on March 14, 2003 (R. 30). Also, on March 14, 
2003, Kummer's previous counsel filed a Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause to 
stay the entry of the judgment pending the appeal (R. 31-32). Provo City filed a 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause on 
March 20, 2003 (R. 43-45). After oral arguments heard on April 21,2003, the trial court 
issued the Certificate of Probable Cause staying the imposition of Kummer's sentence, 
pending the outcome of appeal (R. 51-53). 
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On April 29, 2003, Scott Williams filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for 
Kummer and To Appoint Alternate Counsel and the district court approved the motion 
on May 27, 2003 and appointed current counsel to represent Kummer (R. 60-69). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On November 5, 2002 Officer Taylor of the Utah County Sheriffs Office 
observed a silver colored Plymouth make an improper right-hand turn that was so wide it 
crossed the outside of the number two (2) lane, as well as into the number one (1) lane 
(R. 77 at 4-7). After observing said turn, Officer Taylor observed the same vehicle 
weaving in and out of the inside lane over the center line and into the painted island (R. 
77 at 8). Officer Taylor then effected a traffic stop of the vehicle (R. 77 at 9-10). Officer 
Taylor recognized the driver, Kummer, by his Utah Driver's License and from previous 
dealings (R. 77 at 11). Officer Taylor also made a positive identification of Kummer 
during the trial (R. 77 at 11). 
Officer Taylor noted that Kummer's speech was rapid and his voice was 
somewhat raspy but acknowledged that this was how Kummer regularly speaks (R. 77 at 
11). Officer Taylor also noted that Kummer was having a hard time paying attention and 
keeping his eyes open as if he were tired, and his eyelids were droopy (R. 77 at 11-12). 
Officer Taylor had Kummer exit the vehicle to perform field sobriety tests 
(R. 77 at 12). Prior to conducting field sobriety tests, Officer Taylor specifically asked 
Kummer if he had any problems that would effect his ability to walk on a straight line in 
a prescribed manner and to stand on one (1) foot (R. 77 at 19-20). Kummer said that he 
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had a spinal cord problem and therefore the walking and standing on one (1) leg test 
were not administered (R. 77 at 20). Officer Taylor then administered the Romberg 
Balance Test which consisted of having Kummer stand with his feet together, hands by 
his sides and head tilted back and eyes closed and estimating a passage of thirty (30) 
seconds (R. 77 at 20-22). Officer Taylor testified that Kummer swayed six (6) to eight 
(8) inches circularly, as well as front to back and side to side and estimated thirty (30) 
seconds at a eleven (11) actual seconds which was timed by Officer Taylor with his 
watch (R. 77 at 22). In Officer Taylor's judgment, he characterized Kummer's 
performance on said test as poor and felt that his balance was impaired that there was a 
definite problem with Kummer's perception of time (R. 77 at 22). 
Officer Taylor then had Kummer perform the modified finger-to-nose test 
where the subject's feet are together, hands at their sides making fists with both hands, 
turning their palms outward and extending their index fingers, tilting their head back and 
closing their eyes (R. 77 at 23). The subject is then instructed with his left or right hand, 
to touch the tip of the finger to the tip of his nose and return it to the subject's sides (R. 
77 at 23-24). Officer Taylor testified that Kummer missed touching his finger to his nose 
on five (5) of six (6) attempts (R. 77 at 24). Officer Taylor also noted a sway during this 
test as well (R. 77 at 24). In Officer Taylor's estimation, Kummer had also failed this 
test (R. 77 at 24-25). 
Officer Taylor then had Kummer perform two (2) more field sobriety tests, 
a hand slap and finger count test (R. 77 at 25-28). Officer Taylor testified that 
Defendant, in his estimation, also failed these tests (R. 77 at 26-28). Officer Taylor 
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testified that all said tests were administered on a concrete flat sidewalk on a sunny day at 
approximately 11:43 a.m. (R. 77 at 24). Officer Taylor also performed a horizontal gaze 
nystagmus test on Kummer and testified that all clues of drug use were present and 
distinct in both of Kummer's eyes and consistent with what Kummer had told Officer 
Taylor he had taken (R. 77 at 28-30). 
During cross examination Officer Taylor acknowledged that there are 
individuals who would have a hard time with the Romberg balancing test even if they 
were not impaired by alcohol or another drug (R. 77 at 51). He also acknowledged that 
the same would be true of the other tests, that there are individuals for whatever reasons, 
or handicap, that they may have trouble with those tests (R. 77 at 51). 
Officer Taylor testified that he believed Kummer was impaired to a degree 
that he could not safely operate a vehicle and he placed hiin under arrest for DUI (R. 77 
at 30). Kummer was handcuffed and transported to the Utah County Jail (R. 77 at 31). 
Officer Taylor testified that while being transported Kummer was "on the nod" and 
droopy eyelids (R. 77 at 31). Officer Taylor explained that "on the nod" is where people 
would literally fall asleep and their head will relax forward but that it is different from 
being asleep, rather it appears that they are asleep but they interact and answer you when 
you talk to them (R. 77 at 31-32). 
Officer Taylor testified that during the field sobriety tests and in the car, 
Kummer told him that he had taken Lortab that day for which he had a legitimate 
prescription for his spinal cord problem (R. 77 at 32-33). Officer Taylor also testified 
that while being interviewed at the Jail, after being mirandized and having waived his 
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rights, Kummer stated to him that he had taken some Lortab and Soma earlier in the 
morning around 8:00 a.m. (R. 77 at 34-35). 
During direct examination during trial, Officer Taylor identified himself as 
a fully certified drug recognition expert and a drug recognition expert instructor (R. 77 at 
12-14). Officer Taylor testified during trial that Lortab is a narcotic and a pain killer that 
has central nervous system depressant effects which causes people to slow down, appear 
asleep, appear tired (R. 77 at 36). Officer Taylor described Soma as a controlled but not 
a scheduled drug and is considered a muscle relaxant and that when taken with other 
drugs that have a central nervous system depressant effect, can have a compounding 
effect upon the way it can impact somebody's coordination (R. 77 at 37). Officer Taylor 
further testified that if one were taking a solely therapeutic dose of Soma or solely a 
therapeutic dose of Lortab, that one may or may not be impaired, but that when both are 
taken together, it could have a compounding effect (R. 77 at 37). 
Officer Taylor also testified that Kummer refused to give blood and urine 
samples or doing anything further (R. 77 at 44). Therefore, Officer Taylor did not obtain 
a pulse, blood pressure, temperature or look closer into Kummer's eyes (R. 77 at 44). 
Officer Taylor also stated that Kummer was upset about going to jail and did not want to 
cooperate with several things, but that he was cooperative over all, and although he was 
unhappy with what was going on and Officer Taylor was therefore unable to conduct a 
full drug influence evaluation (R. 77 at 17-18). 
Officer Taylor also stated during cross examination in response to 
questioning that the duration effects for Soma and Lortab are four (4) to six (6) hours and 
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that his information was obtained from the physician's desk references and other medical 
and pharmacological texts (R. 77 at 53). Officer Taylor also stated that the duration of 
the effect of the drugs would not be depend upon the amount of the drug taken (R. 77 at 
53). Officer Taylor also acknowledged that he had never seen the prescription bottles of 
Kummer and therefore did not know whether said bottles had stickers warning Kummer 
of driving or operation heavy machinery, drowsiness or other effects (R. 77 at 54-55). 
During the trial, defense counsel called Jack Powell, who was previously in 
the car with Kummer on November 5, 2002, the date in question (R. 77 at 57-58). 
Powell was also present when Kummer took his Soma and Lortab doses at 8:00 a.m. that 
morning (R. 77 at 58-60). Powell stated that after that, Kummer and he got into 
Kummer's car with Kummer driving and began driving around (R. 77 at 59). Powell 
testified that he drove around with Mr. Kummer for a couple of hours and then was 
dropped off at Hotel Roberts (R. 77 at 59-60). Powell also testified that he did not notice 
anything peculiar about the way Kummer was driving on that day (R. 77 at 59). He also 
testified at the time he was dropped off, he did not see any indicators in his mind what 
would have given him an indication that Kummer was impaired or did not seem safe to 
be driving a vehicle (R. 77 at 60). He also testified that Kummer was not speaking 
differently that he normally does (R. 77 at 60). 
During trial, Kummer took the stand in his own defense and testified that 
he did not cross the line as testified to by Officer Taylor (R. 77 at 67-68). He also 
testified that contrary to Officer Taylor's testimony, Officer Taylor made a U-Turn in 
order to follow him (R. 77 at 68). Kummer testified that he had previous run ins with the 
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Sheriffs office of which he had been previously acquitted and that he was very nervous 
(R. 77 at 68). Kummer testified that Officer Taylor also accused him of being on meth 
(R. 77 at 66-67 and 68-69). Kummer confirmed that he was taking Lortab and Soma (R. 
7 at 68). Kummer also testified that he had been Soma and Lortab for over ten (10) 
years, that he has a birth defect, that he is in pain all the time and that he has been living 
with pain pills constantly (R. 77 at 69). Kummer testified that he was on the pills at that 
time three (3) a day, one (1) every four (4) hours and that he had valid prescriptions for 
said pills (R. 77 at 70). Kummer also testified that the doctors would not let him go any 
higher on his dosage because it scares the doctor (R. 77 at 71). Kummer also testified 
that when he first started taking the pills, that he was to restrict his driving for a little 
while but that was when he first started taking them and that over the years he has gotten 
used to them (R. 77 at 71). Kummer further testified that he was told he could still drive 
(R. 77 at 73). 
Kummer testified that on the day in question after he had taken the pills 
and when he was pulled over, he was not feeling anything but that he was nervous due to 
being pulled over (R. 77 at 71-72). Kummer became upset fairly quickly after being 
pulled over (R. 77 at 72). Kummer also testified that was scared to death when Officer 
Taylor was driving him to the jail because Officer Taylor was all over the highway and 
could not even keep in the lane himself (R. 77 at 72). Kummer also stated that he told 
the officer that he could not perform the field sobriety tests as for having including 
leaning his head back because of the spinal cord injury (R. 77 at 72-73). Kummer also 
testified that he tried to get Officer Taylor to call his doctor several times to confirm his 
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condition (R. 77 at 74). 
Kummer said he would not submit to blood test without his doctor because 
he could not give blood because all the veins in his arms were gone and that they have to 
do it with his jugular vein or another vein where he won't let people touch (R. 77 at 75). 
Under cross examination, Kummer stated that he did not know whether he 
was weaving or not because he was watching the Officer in his mirror because he was 
following him so close (R. 77 at 76-77). 
At the conclusion of trial, and after arguments by counsel, the court found 
Kummer guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the lane change violation and driving under 
the influence of drugs based on Kummer's driving pattern and field sobriety tests and the 
testimony that Kummer had taken Soma and Lortab three (3) three and an half (3 14) 
hours prior to being pulled over (R. 77 at 88-91). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Kummer asserts that the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable such that reasonable minds should have entertained reasonable doubt that he 
driving under the influence of drugs to a degree that he was incapable of safely operating 
a motor vehicle. 
Furthermore, not only was the evidence insufficient, but the insufficiency was 
obvious and fundamental so that defense counsel was ineffective in not moving for a 
dismissal of the driving under the influence charge at the conclusion of the City's case in 
chief. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE RECORD ESTABLISHED THAT ALTHOUGH KUMMER 
WAS ADMITTEDLY TAKING VALID PRESCRIPTIONS OF 
SOMA AND LORTAB ON THE DAY OF HIS ARREST, THAT HE 
HAD BEEN TAKING SAID PRESCRIPTIONS FOR YEARS, WAS 
ONLY TAKING THE PRESCRIBED THERAPUTIC DOSES, AND 
WAS NOT INCAPABLE OF SAFELY OPERATING A VEHICLE 
AND DEFENSE COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN NOT MOVING TO DISMISS THE 
CHARGE OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLLUENCE 
A. The Evidence is Insufficient to Support Rummer's Conviction 
A review of all the evidence shows that although Kummer had taken a soma and 
lortab approximately three and one-half (3 1/2) hours prior to being stopped, he was not 
incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle. "To demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient to support a jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 
1fl4, 989 P.2d 1065 (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 
1991)). "[W]e will conclude that the evidence was insufficient when, after viewing the 
evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that 
reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^ [18 (quoting 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). Then the defendant must show "that 
the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting 
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the case to the jury." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at |17. 
The following is a summation of all the evidence which supports the trial court's 
verdict of guilt. 
On November 5, 2002 Officer Taylor of the Utah County Sheriffs Office 
observed a silver colored Plymouth make an improper right-hand turn that was so wide it 
crossed the outside of the number two (2) lane, as well as into the number one (1) lane 
(R. 77 at 4-7). After observing said turn, Officer Taylor observed the same vehicle 
weaving in and out of the inside lane over the center line and into the painted island (R. 
77 at 8). Officer Taylor then effected a traffic stop of the vehicle (R. 77 at 9-10). Officer 
Taylor observed the driver, the Defendant Buddy Kummer, by his Utah Driver's License 
and from previous dealings (R. 77 at 11). Officer Taylor also made a positive 
identification of Kummer during the Trial (R. 77 at 11). 
Officer Taylor noted that Kummer's speech was rapid and his voice was 
somewhat raspy but acknowledged that this was how Kummer regularly speaks (R. 77 at 
11). Officer Taylor also noted that Kummer was having a hard time paying attention and 
keeping his eyes open as if he were tired, and his eye lids were droopy (R. 77 at 11-12). 
Officer Taylor had Kummer exit the vehicle to perform field sobriety tests (R. 77 at 12). 
During direct examination during trial, Officer Taylor identified himself as a fully 
certified drug recognition expert and instructor of the same (R. 77 at 12-14). Kummer did 
not allow Officer Taylor to conduct a full drug influence evaluation (R. 77 at 17-18). 
Prior to conducting field sobriety tests, Officer Taylor specifically asked Kummer if he 
had any problems that would effect his ability to walk on a line in a prescribed manner a 
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straight line and to stand on one (1) foot (R. 77 at 19-20). Kummer said that he had a 
spinal cord problem and therefore the walking and standing on one (1) leg test were not 
administered (R. 77 at 20). Officer Taylor administered the Romberg Balance Test 
which consisted of having Kummer stand with his feet together, hands by his sides and 
head tilted back and eyes closed and estimating a passage of thirty (30) seconds (R. 77 at 
20-22). Officer Taylor testified that Kummer swayed six (6) to eight (8) inches 
circularly, as well as front to back and side to side and estimated thirty (30) seconds at a 
eleven (11) actual seconds which was timed by Officer Taylor with his watch (R. 77 at 
22). In Officer Taylor's judgment, he characterized Kummer's performance on said test 
as poor and felt that his balance was impaired that there was a definite problem with 
Kummer's perception of time (R. 77 at 22). 
Officer Taylor also had Kummer perform the modified finger-to-nose test. (R. 77 
at 23). Officer Taylor testified that Kummer missed touching his finger to his nose on 
five (5) of six (6) attempts (R. 77 at 24). Officer Taylor also noted Kummer's sway 
during this test as well (R. 77 at 24). In Officer Taylor's estimation, Kummer failed this 
test (R. 77 at 24-25). 
Officer Taylor also had Kummer perform two (2) more field sobriety tests, a hand 
slap and finger count test (R. 77 at 25-28). Officer Taylor testified that Defendant, in his 
estimation, also failed these tests (R. 77 at 26-28). Officer Taylor testified that all said 
tests were administered on a concrete flat sidewalk on a sunny day at approximately 
11:43 a.m. (R. 77 at 24). Officer Taylor also performed a horizontal gaze nystagmus test 
on Kummer and testified that all clues of drug use were present and distinct in both of 
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Kummer's eyes and consistent with what Kummer had told Officer Taylor he had taken 
(R. 77 at 28-30). 
Officer Taylor testified that while being transported Kummer was "on the nod" 
and droopy eyelids. Officer Taylor explained that "on the nod" is where people would 
literally fall asleep and their head will relax forward but that it is different from being 
asleep. It appears that they are asleep but they interact and answer you when you talk to 
them (R. 77 at 31-32). Officer Taylor testified that during the field sobriety test and in 
the car, Kummer told him that he had taken Lortab that day for which he had a legitimate 
prescription for his spinal cord problem (R. 77 at 32-33). Officer Taylor also testified 
that while being interviewed at the Jail, after being mirandized and having waived his 
rights, Kummer stated to him that he had taken some Lortab and Soma earlier in the 
morning around 8:00 a.m. (R. 77 at 34-35). 
Officer Taylor testified during trial that Lortab is a narcotic and a pain killer that 
has central nervous system depressant effects which causes people to slow down, appear 
asleep, appear tired (R. 77 at 36). Officer Taylor described Soma as a controlled but not 
a scheduled drug and is considered a muscle relaxant and that when taken with other 
drugs that have a central nervous system depressant effect, can have a compounding 
effect upon the weight and can impact somebody's coordination (R. 77 at 37). Officer 
Taylor further testified that if one were taking a solely therapeutic dose of Soma or solely 
a therapeutic dose of Lortab, that one may or may not be impaired, but that when both are 
taken together, it could have a compounding effect (R. 77 at 37). 
Officer Taylor also testified that Kummer refused to give blood and urine samples 
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or doing anything further (R. 77 at 44). Therefore, Officer Taylor did not obtain a pulse, 
blood pressure, temperature or look closer into Kummer's eyes (R. 77 at 44). During 
cross examination Officer Taylor acknowledged that there are individuals who would 
have a hard time with the Romberg balancing test even if they were not impaired by 
alcohol or another drug (R. 77 at 51). He also acknowledged that the same would be true 
of the other tests, that there are individuals for whatever reasons, handicap, that they may 
have trouble with those tests (R. 77 at 51). Officer Taylor also stated during cross 
examination in response to questioning that the duration effects for Soma and Lortab are 
four (4) to six (6) hours and that his information was obtained from the physician's desk 
references and other medical and pharmacological texts (R. 77 at 53). Officer Taylor 
also stated that the duration of the effect of the drugs would not be depend upon the 
amount of the drug taken (R. 77 at 53). Officer Taylor also acknowledged that he had 
never seen the prescription bottles of Kummer and therefore did not know whether said 
bottles had stickers warning Kummer of driving or operation heavy machinery, 
drowsiness or other effects (R. 77 at 54-55). 
These marshaled facts when viewed in totality with the other facts presented at 
trial are insufficient to support the trial court's verdict. 
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L Although Kummer freely acknowledged having taken his valid 
prescriptions earlier that morning, he had only taken the precribed 
dose and had been taking said medications for years. 
Kummer asserts that this evidence is sufficiently inconclusive such that reasonable 
minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that he was impaired to drive at the time 
he was arrested. First, Kummer freely acknowledged to the officer and on the stand that 
he had valid prescriptions for lortab and soma and had taken his prescibed dose at around 
8:00 a.m. of the morning he was arrested. (R. 77 at 32-35, 58-60, 68-70). Kummer 
further testified that he had taken said medication or similar medication for about ten (10) 
years, that he was used to the effects of said medications, which he testified was nothing 
anymore, and that he was told he could still drive and no doctor had told him he couldn't 
(R. 77 at 69, 71-73). There was no expert to testify for the city regarding the effects of a 
person who has been on a certain medication(s) long-term, such as Kummer for 10 years, 
and their ability to adapt or not to said medication(s)' effects. 
Therefore, it is entirely reasonable to assume that a person such as Kummer, one 
who had been told he could drive on said medications and having taken them over such a 
long period of time, evidence which was uncontroverted, it is reasonable to assume that 
the dosage of the prescribed medications he had taken earlier did not necessarily impair 
him to drive. 
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ii. Kummer's seemingly poor performance on field sobriety tests and the 
driving pattern do not necessarily indicate he was impaired to drive 
but can be explained by other facts in evidence. 
Although Officer Taylor testified that in his opinion Kummer failed several field 
sobriety tests that he administered, because of other facts in evidence, said tests were 
insufficient to demonstrate that Kummer was impaired to drive. Officer Taylor 
acknowledged that Kummer told him about certain injuries that would prevent him from 
walking in a straight line and performing a standing test (R. 19-20). Kummer also 
testified that prior to attempting to perform the other field sobriety tests administered by 
Officer Taylor that he informed the officer of his spinal cord problem and neck injury, 
bad heart, and his inability to perform said tests and that he didn't have his brace on and 
could lean his head back (R. 77 at 66, 67, 70, 72-73). Kummer also testified that he 
attempted five (5) or six (6) times to get Officer Taylor to call his doctor and confirm his 
prescriptions, his injuries and his ability to drive but that Officer Taylor would not do so 
(R. 77 at 66, 69, 72-74, 78). 
Kummer additionally testified that the reason he refused the blood draw at 
the jail without his doctor present was because he had poor veins in his arms and that to 
obtain his blood sample it had to be taken from his jugular veins or elsewhere where he 
wouldn't let people touch (R. 77 at 74-75). 
Kummer further testified that he was upset and nervous when he was 
pulled over, that he is always nervous, and that the nervousness, in addition to his 
medical conditions, was a large reason for why he couldn't satisfactorily perform the 
field sobriety tests (R. 77 at 68, 72, 74, 78-79). Officer Taylor himself acknowledged on 
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cross examination that there are individuals who would have a hard time with the 
Romberg balancing test even if they were not impaired by alcohol or another drug (R. 77 
at 51). He also acknowledged that the same would be true of the other tests, that there 
are individuals for whatever reasons, or handicap, that they may have trouble with those 
tests (R. 77 at 51). Therefore, Kummer's seemingly poor performance on the sobriety 
tests he attempted could also be explained by his medical problems and injuries including 
his spinal cord, back and neck problems. 
Finally, the driving pattern Officer Taylor testified he witnessed, that of Kummer 
crossing inside lines and weaving, can be just as easily explained by Kummer's 
testimony that he was watching the officer in his rear-view mirror and therefore didn't 
know whether he was weaving but implying it was therefore possible (R. 77 at 4-8, 76-
77). Whatever weaving did occur, therefore, was just a likely a result of Kummer's 
inattention to the road and his attention on the officer following him as it was due to any 
influence of drugs in Kummer's system. 
B. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO MOVE FOR A DISMISSAL OF 
THE DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE CHARGE CONSTITUTED 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Kummer asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his 
counsel failed to motion for a dismissal of the driving under the influence charge. 
The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for "failing to make a motion for 
directed verdict succeeds only if the State's evidence was not sufficient to support a 
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conviction/' State v. Reyes, 2000 UT App 310 (memorandum decision) (Cf. Tillman v. 
Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 222 (Utah 1993), cert denied 510 U.S. 1050, 114 S.Ct. 706, 126 
L.Ed.2d 671 (1994) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on failure to move to 
dismiss where the evidence to convict was sufficient)). In order to establish ineffective 
assistance of counsel, it is the defendant's burden to show "first, that his counsel 
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and second, that 
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, f25, 1 
P.3d 546 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994)); see also 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 669, 104 S.Ct 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. 
Hunt, 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989). Where the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the issue is resolved as a matter of 
law. State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah App.), cert denied 883 P.2d 1359 (1994). 
As stated above, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to render a 
verdict rather than a dismissal. To prove driving under the influence of drugs in this 
instance, the City had to present evidence showing that not only was Kummer driving 
while under the influence of drugs, but that he was unable to safely operate a vehicle at 
the time as a result of said drugs (See U.C.A. Section 41-6-44). The City did present 
evidence that Kummer was driving and did so at a time when he had controlled 
substances in his system. However, the City failed to present sufficient evidence as a 
matter of law to establish that Kummer could not safely operate a vehicle as a result of 
said substances/drugs. 
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Thus, the evidence did not show sufficiently that Kummer was not incapable of 
safely operating a motor vehicle. Therefore, defense counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance for failing to make a motion for a dismissal of the driving under the influence 
charge. But for this failure, the trial court would not have entered a guilty verdict and 
Kummer would not have been convicted of driving under the influence. Accordingly, 
because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction, defense 
counsel's performance fails the two prong test set out in Strickland. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Kummer asks this Court to reverse his conviction for 
driving under the influence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of December, 2003. 
Patrick V. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES 
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 
ARTICLE 5. DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS DRIVING 
41-6-44 Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration —Measurement 
of blood or breath alcohol —Criminal punishment —Arrest without warrant — 
Penalties —Suspension or revocation of license. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driving 
under Subsections (9) and (10); 
(iii) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled substance 
that is taken illegally in the body; 
(iv) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or a 
combination of both-related reckless driving adopted in compliance with 
Section 41-6-43; 
(v) automobile homicide under Section 7 6-5-207; or 
(vi) a violation described in Subsections (1) (a) (i) through (v) , which 
judgment of conviction is reduced under Section 7 6-3-402; or 
(vii) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United 
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States 
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol, any drug, 
or a combination of both-related reckless driving if committed in this 
state, including punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815; 
(b) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a substance 
abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
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(c) "screening and assessment" means a substance abuse addiction and 
dependency screening and assessment obtained at a substance abuse program that 
is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in accordance 
with Section 62A-15-105; 
(d) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious 
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any 
bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death; 
(e) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a substance abuse 
program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health m 
accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(f) "substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed substance abuse 
program; 
(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance 
similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; and 
(h) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to 
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person 
exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(I) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test 
shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater at the time of the test, 
(n) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
( m ) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 08 grams or greater 
at the time of operation or actual physical control. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been 
legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any charge 
of violating this section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol 
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per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of 
Subsection (2) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result 
of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of 
the offense; or 
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 years of 
age in the vehicle at the time of the offense. 
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third 
degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon 
another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent 
manner. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first 
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 4 8 consecutive 
hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not Less than 48 
hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or 
home confinement, the court shall: 
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